Read more

Date: May 2024

Method: Monitoring of group propaganda (videos, photos, statements, claims) and reports from field sources.

Areas/Country: Pakistan

Using the TTP publication and with the help of graphs, we can see that the group conducted 98 attacks in May. The targets remain almost always the same: the Pakistani army, Pakistani police, counter-terrorist operatives and border guards.

Below the graphs to see the areas of military activity in May:

Out of 98 claimed attacks, 92 have been carried out in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, while three in Balochistan province (Quetta and Zhob districts), and three in Punjab province (Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Dera Ghazi Khan, in the south).

The larger Waziristan region witnessed most attacks, with the North Waziristan tribal district registering 21 attacks and the South Waziristan tribal district 16. In line with the ongoing pattern of insurgency, the Khyber tribal district also witnesses a high number of attacks, 13 in total. However, two regions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have been marked by an unusual spate of attacks.  Tank district and Bajaur tribal district registered 11 and 10 attacks, respectively, mostly targeting security forces but also local tribal militias. This highlights the TTP new offensive in these two territories; particularly, Bajaur witnessed a considerable increase in attacks which started the previous month.

Compared to previous months, the TTP continues to be militarily very active, maintaining a very high number of military operations, as can be seen from the following graph:

Conclusion:

The TTP’s ongoing insurgency remains set on the trajectory the group inaugurated in full force in August 2021. After the brief hiatus of 2022 during the attempted peace talks between Islamabad and the TTP, the latter has been steadily increasing not only the number of claimed attacks in the country, but also expanding its areas of operations from traditionally Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and increasingly into Balochistan and, recently, Punjab, marking a turn in the group’s challenge to the authorities.

In the next months, the TTP attack will gain more strength and increase over time, possibly involving new areas of attacks and reinforcing current ones.

Read more

Significantly, soon after the start of the attack, the spokesmen of two major subfactions of Hafiz Gul Bahadur group (HGB) claimed responsibility for the assault, arguing that a joint operation between Jaish-e-Fursan-e-Muhammad (JFM) and Jaish-e-Omari (JeO) was undergoing in the area. The spokesmen of the two factions, Nasratullah Waziristani and Zarar Dawar, respectively, constantly gave live update on the attack, sharing also videos of the initial explosion and subsequent clashes, hinting that more militants were surrounding the area of the attack to record and take pictures.

Some HGB members shared the names of some attackers online; hence, it was revealed that the militant who rammed the vehicle laden with explosives into the military installation in order to pave the way for other HGB militants was named Zarqawi, from the Al-Hamza Battalion of the JFM suicide squad. Initial message circulated by HGB members, instead, claimed that he was named Jafar. This is because the real name of the individual was Jafar and his nom de guerre Zarqawi, as HGB spokesman confirmed. Meanwhile, another militant, Junaid, was killed in early clashes with security forces. Both Fursan al-Aalaam – the media mouthpiece of JFM – and several members of the group issued statements in Pashto and Urdu detailing the attack.

Eventually, Pakistan’s security forces effectively repelled the attackers. A joint statement from the two HGB factions revealed that in total, 6 attackers took part in the operation; four died in the first suicide attack and in the subsequent clashes, while two managed to escape the scene and rejoin their groups.

In a private conversation, HGB spokesman added that all six militants had been trained in North Waziristan in camps which are operational under HGB umbrella. Three militants including Jafar had been trained in North Waziristan, where HGB had recently opened a training center under the leadership of Khalid Waziristani, the amir of JFM. While the three other militants had been trained in a camp operated by JeO, whose amir is Ali Dawar.

It is significant to highlight that this marks the first openly claimed collaboration between two different HGB factions. While in the past, JFM and JeO had carried out attacks, in a change, HGB is increasingly relying on social media to signal its operations and the activities of its militants, in a similar way as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). As a matter of fact, several TTP affiliated media channels also reported the attack, sharing the updates given by JFM spokesman, Nasratullah Waziristani, through Fursan al-Aalaam. Such a high profile attack by HGB militants is not frequent, as the group usually stages suicide attacks without the follow-up of other militants who assault the security forces. Such tactics have been extensively employed by a TTP affiliate, Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), which, however, has gone silent for the last four months.

More details from the HGB are expected to be released soon, as HGB spokesman hinted that the group was soon going to release obituaries of the deceased militants as well as a video documenting the attack.

Hafiz Gul Bahadur supporters started to share the information online, arguing that allegiance between the two organisations was the main topic of discussion of a number of meetings which had been specifically held in order to create a united front among jihadist parties in Pakistan affiliated with the Pakistani Taliban.

Soon afterwards, many other accounts, both affiliated with the TTP and with HGB flooded social media platforms with the reported news, wishing for a positive results for the ongoing talks. Some supporters argued that this would be an important goal for Pakistani Taliban factions in order to reinforce the unity among different factions.

Subsequently, some news outlets started to report that HGB and another faction of Pakistani Taliban, Tehreek-e-Lashkar-e-Islam Pakistan (TLIP, or simply Lashkar-e-Islam, LeI) had both pledged allegiance to the TTP leader, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud. Some pro-TTP and pro-Afghan Taliban accounts, too, shared this news, claiming that they had united under one leader and one flag.

However, after a couple of days, the TTP and HGB factions rejected this news. While the militants acknowledged that talks did happen between the two for the creation of a united platform, they stated that for now, no major decision has been adopted, and that talks were still ongoing. Particularly, HGB spokesman made clear that Hafiz Gul Bahadur did not pledge allegiance, and that his faction was still dubious on how to combine the two factions and the rules of merging. Another major faction of HGB, such as Jabhat Ansar al-Mahdi Khorasan (JAMK), through the latter’s spokesman, also confirmed that no decision had been taken.

On the other hand, some TTP linked communications’ channels issued a detailed statement claiming a series of talks regarding a potential alliance among the three major factions of the Pakistani Taliban: TTP, HGB, and TLIP. The statement states that constructive discussions have been ongoing for the past week with the aim of "sustaining the armed struggle in Pakistan under a unified leadership." Statement further revealed that however the talks have temporarily halted now, and they are expected to resume in near future.

However, it is worth noticing that senior TTP members, when asked about the authenticity of the statement, argued that the latter had been published on a personal capacity by an individual, and not by the organisation, hence obscuring the organisations’s stance.

Furthermore, while some TTP members - such as a prominent propagandist and ideologue of the organisation - rejoiced of the possible merger, other militants, specifically some HGB affiliated members, expressed concern over the matter, arguing that there is no need of creating one sole organisation; rather, strategic cooperation between HGB and TTP was to be preferred. This created a some noise among TTP and HGB members, with the former arguing with the latter that unity among jihadist factions is a priority.

Hence, while the issue is still ongoing and militant factions are trying to remain silent over the discussion, some considerations can be made.

Over the course of 2023, there have been visible instances of cooperations between different Pakistani Taliban militant factions, such as HGB and TTP and TTP and Lashkar-e-Islam . This trend is continuing also during 2024. Furthermore, the TTP is set on a trajectory which sees itself as the main jihadist faction in Pakistan, with the intent of incorporating other factions. Since mid 2021, the TTP has merged 47 jihadist groups and subgroups from Pakistani Taliban, sectarian outfits, and Al-Qaida affiliates. In the recent past, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud had also suggested to Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) leader, Usama Mahmood, to disband the local branch of Al-Qaida and join hands with the TTP; a request which was rejected. Nevertheless, the TTP is trying to centralise the jihadist front under its leadership. This has also sparked some frictions with other jihadist parties; for instance, in early 2024, differences between TTP and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar became more visibile.

If the ongoing talks between HGB and TTP would succeed, this would further jeopardise the situation in South Khyber Pakhtnukhwa, while expanding the TTP base in the province posing new challenges to the security forces.

Seemingly, the TTP activities sparked the reaction of other factions of the Pakistani Taliban, who wanted to join the new trend in order to gain popularity among jihadist circles.

Significantly, major group of Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) and its subgroups also produced videos of their armed men patrolling inhabited areas. On February 25, several videos appeared online shared by spokesman of a subgroup of HGB, Jabhat al-Junud al-Mahdi. The videos showed several Pakistani Taliban patrolling the streets of Sardi Khel area of Baka Khel region of Bannu district and checking the cars of the locals. Other videos showed militants parading in the streets or eating food together with local population.

It is significant to note that the Jabhat al-Junud al-Mahdi subgroup of HGB (not to be confused with another HGB subgroup, Jabhat Ansar al-Mahdu Khorasan, JAMK), headed by Amir Sufiyan, is also known as Sufiyan Karwan, which has been conducting devastating suicide atacks in Bannu district in the past.

The recent dynamics show the desider of all Pakistani Taliban factions for creating areas where they can establish proto-jihadist states where to enforce and administrate Sharia. Pakistani Taliban factions in the past frequently managed to infiltrate in such spaces to model their own version of state; however, since 2014, when many Pakistani Taliban factions were forced to retreat into Afghanistan’s territory due to Pakistan’s Zarb-e-Azb military operation, the TTP and other Pakistani Taliban groups decided to abandon the strategy of enforcing Sharia on local population, as they might lose local support or attract unwanted attention from security agencies.

However, recently, there has been a general re-orientation of many militant organisations in Pakistan, which pose a looming threat on the stability of the country.

In a first message issued on February 19, Abu Abdullah stated that the group had conducted an attack against FP forces in Lanao del Norte as a response to the AFP military operation in Lanao del Sur, the stronghold of the group, south of Marawi city. During the clashes, ISEAP claimed they have killed 6 AFP soldiers.

A second message issued on February 20, written by the Shura Council (Leadership Shura) of ISEAP and conveyed by Abu Abdullah, addressed ISEAP militants, congratulating them for their operations in Lanao del Norte. While the message implicitly acknowledged that the group suffered casualties in Lanao del Sur during AFP recent military offensive, Abu Abdullah argued that the group was able to counter attack in Lanao del Norte.

The message also carried a threat directed to informants of the AFP forces, warning them of consequences if they were to be captured.

It is significant to note that ISEAP has also engaged in fighting with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which the group repeatedly stated are collaborating with AFP forces in order to dislodge the group from Lanao del Sur.

ISEAP-Philippines has been increasing its operations since mid-2023. Significantly, the group has been able not only to conduct attacks in Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, but in early December 2023, it claimed an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in Marawi city, too, targeting the Minadano State University and killing several people.

It is worth highlighting that such attacks have been also acknowledged and praised by Islamic State Central in its weekly newsletters al-Naba, issue 431.