Majlis-e-Askari Karwan (MAK) is a Pakistani Taliban militant group that has steadily carved out space for itself among larger and more dominant factions. Known for its pragmatic strategy, MAK frequently collaborates with a range of militant groups, positioning itself as a flexible local actor that adds operational and strategic value to others.

In recent months, the group has demonstrated noticeable growth in both capability and ambition, emerging as an increasingly relevant faction within the militant landscape of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the former tribal districts.

Leadership and Fragmentation

MAK is led by veteran jihadist commander Akhtar Muhammad Khalil Mansoor. Until 2021, Akhtar Khalil served as a Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander in Bannu district. Due to internal differences with the TTP leadership over the command structure in North Waziristan and recent mergers allowed by the TTP, he later joined the Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) faction, now known as Tehreek-e-Taliban Ghazwatul Hind (TTG).

Between 2021 and 2022, his faction weakened as rival local commanders rose in prominence, leading to a loss of influence. Several commanders who had previously operated under him formed their own factions and aligned independently with HGB. Among them was Sadar Hayat, also known as Abu Sufyan, who now leads the Jabhat al-Junood al-Mahdi subfaction of TTG and previously served as deputy head of MAK.

In 2024, Akhtar Khalil attempted to forge an alliance with the TTP faction Jamaatul Ahrar (JuA), engaging in discussions with JuA political leader Sarbakaf Mohmand. The effort collapsed after TTP intervened to placate JuA, which ultimately refused to merge with MAK.

Akhtar Khalil has also maintained a history of informal engagement with Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). When ISKP first emerged in eastern Afghanistan under former Pakistani Taliban commanders, Khalil sought to benefit from its rising strength by maintaining contacts and briefly collaborating, though without openly aligning himself with the group.

It is worth noticing that prior to these events, Akhtar Khalil used to host Al-Qaida leaders in Waziristan as well as cooperate with Al-Qaida, fighting under its banner, until 2014 and Pakistan’s Zarb-e-Azb Operation. Shortly after Pakistan’s military intervention, Akhtar Khalil joined the TTP, remaining with the latter until 2021.

Operational Footprint

MAK primarily operates in Bannu, Lakki Marwat, and North Waziristan, while also maintaining a presence in Khyber and Orakzai. Since mid-2025, the group has carried out approximately 30 attacks across these regions.

Most operations have been concentrated in southern Bannu, particularly in Jani Khel, Ali Khel, Wali Noor, Nikori, Howaid, and Seentanga, areas near the Lakki Marwat border where the group is also active. Its tactics typically include sniper attacks, ambushes, raids, and assaults on security checkposts and small forts.

In Khyber district, MAK has conducted limited operations in parts of the Tirah Valley, largely in coordination with stronger factions. The group collaborates closely with JuA and Tehreek-e-Lashkar-e-Islam Pakistan (TLIP), sometimes refraining from openly claiming responsibility despite video evidence suggesting its involvement. This indicates a calculated approach in which militants are deployed either to execute attacks or to support allied organisations. For instance, In October 2025, MAK reported that three of its militants were killed in Orakzai while travelling from Khyber to North Waziristan, underscoring its cross-district mobility.

The group’s cooperative approach extends beyond Khyber. On November 3, 2025, MAK claimed a joint attack with TTP in the Ghazi Khel area of Lakki Marwat. At the time, TTP had reduced public claims amid tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, instead relying on proxy groups to acknowledge attacks. MAK collaborated with one such proxy, Lashkar-e-Defa al-Quds (LDQ), jointly claiming some operations in Jani Khel.

Although smaller than major Pakistani Taliban factions, MAK occasionally attracts individual commanders. In December 2025, spokesman Abdullah Waziristani announced that Qari Ababil, a local commander from Haider Khel in North Waziristan, had pledged allegiance to Akhtar Khalil along with his fighters. Such defections, however, remain limited compared to larger factions.

A More Ambitious 2026

At the start of 2026, MAK signalled growing ambition through two significant developments.

On January 6, 2026, the group released a detailed organisational chart outlining its internal structure. A previous chart issued in February 2025 had presented a relatively simple framework, listing a military chief, intelligence chief, commander of military units, and head of an economic wing, alongside three operational zones: Mir Ali, Seentanga, and Khyber.

The 2026 chart reflected expansion. It introduced a general commander, replacing the military chief, and added a reform commission tasked with overseeing militant activities, a model previously adopted by TTG and other factions. New operational areas were designated under specific commanders, including Datta Khel, Lakki Marwat, and Khaisoor. Each role now includes a deputy, suggesting an effort to institutionalise command structures.

New and existing affiliates were integrated into the updated framework. Previosuly mentioned Qari Ababil was appointed commander-in-chief for Datta Khel, while former economic and intelligence chiefs Miwan and Maliyar transitioned to the reform commission. The creation of this commission aligns with broader shifts among Pakistani Taliban factions toward more structured and bureaucratic organisational models since 2023.

The second development was the release of a professionally produced training video. While such content is common among Pakistani Taliban factions, MAK’s latest production closely resembled those of larger groups such as TTP, TTG, and Harakat Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (IIP). For the first time, the group unveiled its Saad Bin Abu Waqas training camp. The video shows at least 18 militants in military fatigues undergoing physical drills and weapons training with firearms, RPGs, and machine guns.

Its rhetorical tone is notable. MAK uses Arabic nasheeds inspired by al-Qaida, and commanders repeatedly reference Palestine and Jerusalem rather than focusing solely on Pakistan or Afghanistan. Since 2023, MAK has referred to itself as “Al-Qaida in Waziristan” and adopted stylistic elements associated with al-Qaida. While initially dismissed by some observers as branding, sources within militant circles suggest limited-scale collaboration with al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), often driven by tactical or personal considerations.

AQIS’s influence is visible in the broader ambitions of non-TTP factions. In October 2025, TTG claimed responsibility for an attack in Kashmir, though this remained unverified. More recently, an improvised explosive device attack in Tangir, Diamer district, Gilgit-Baltistan, was claimed by TTP, TTG, and MAK. Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan are considered priority theatres for AQIS due to their strategic proximity to India.

A Pragmatic Militant Actor

MAK is estimated to have around 150 militants. According to militant sources, MAK is not part of the IMP and not affiliated with the TTG. However, it cooperates with everyone. While operating as a jihadist faction, security officials report that the group is also involved in criminal activities such as extortion, kidnapping, and robbery.

Akhtar Khalil maintains longstanding ties with elements of the Haqqani network and Afghan Taliban figures linked to Sirajuddin Haqqani. His survival across shifting militant alignments reflects a pattern of opportunism and pragmatic cooperation.

As tensions persist among Pakistani Taliban factions, MAK’s ability to manoeuvre between rival groups may enhance its relevance. Although still smaller than dominant factions, its expanding structure, collaborative strategy, and ideological signalling suggest a group seeking to elevate its standing within an increasingly fragmented militant landscape.

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) released majority of the contents, mostly addressing the claims that its leader, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, had been killed during Pakistan’s airstrikes on October 9. However, other factions also produced content, including Jamaatul Ahrar (JuA) and Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (IIP), addressing different issues. The high media activity of all Pakistani Taliban during the clashes between Afghan and Pakistani forces reveals that despite multiple efforts to degrade them, Pakistani Taliban capabilities remain largely untouched.

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Essentially, the two issues of the magazine present JeM's reaction to the Pahalgam attack and the apex of JeM’s propaganda following Indian strikes on the Jamia Masjid Subhanallah in Bahawalpur.

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The 12-minute long episode is the fourth one in the series featuring the training and different statements from members of the suicide squad, highlighting their capabilities and commitment to the group’s struggle.

However, this episode is particularly interesting because it features for a brief moment the leader of the sub-faction, Khalid Waziristani. Khalid Waziristani is a prominent leader of HGB and a veteran commander of the war in Afghanistan, enjoining close relations with the so-called Haqqani Network. In the video, he appears while talking to the militants of the al-Hamza Suicide Battalion.

Furthermore, the video also features a member of the battalion who gives a speech in the English language rather than in Pashto. The militant argues that the group is committed to fighting against the state in order to establish an “Islamic government” in Pakistan and to “defend the oppressed ones”.

The majority of the video focuses on the physical and weapons courses held in the Khalid bin Waleed Training Camp, where the al-Hamza Suicide Battalion trains. Clips show militants training with light machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. The majority of the militants use Colt M4A1 carbines and M16A1 rifles previously used in Afghanistan by NATO, and today handled by the special forces of both HGB and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) al-Farooq Training Camp.

For the past two years, HGB has been increasing the number of suicide attacks as well as special operations. Recently, on March 1, HGB claimed a suicide attack carried out in Eidak area of North Waziristan tribal district by Khalid aka Yousuf. Khalid was not a member of the al-Hamza Suicide Battalio; he belonged to another important unit that trains special forces and suicide members of HGB, the Aswadul Harb Suicide Commando, belonging to the Ghaziano Commando. On 26 October 2024, the Aswadul Harb Suicide Commando provided the suicide bomber for a Vehicle Born Suicide Bomb (VBSB) attack in Eidak area, carried out by Yahya.

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The text is an account of the Chinese government’s repressing measures in Xinjiang (East Turkestan province) and an analysis of Chinese economic projects in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. The core message of the text is that according to the author, East Turkestan is not an internal issue of China and the Uyghur people but rather an international issue.

Abdul Salam argues that the TIP has been fighting a defensive war against China since 1949 due to the occupation of the sovereign state of East Turkestan, which China has occupied. He claims that this has been the starting point of a global strategy devised by China, reiterating what the group has been saying for the past decades. However, beyond the content of the booklet, the language used by Abdul Salam is particularly interesting as it is devised to appeal to the international community and, specifically, the West.

The text argues that China employs a combination of economic and defensive tactics to eradicate human rights and freedoms in South Asia and Central Asia by implementing “a very dangerous agenda through charity diplomacy, military force, repression, tyranny, and murder.” Abdul Salam particularly emphasises the economic aspect of this strategy, claiming that China takes advantage of the economic weakness of some countries to take control of important locations in those countries in exchange for debts, plundering their wealth and seizing their economic centers and strategic ports under the pretext of friendship and cooperation. As examples, Abdul Salam cites the cases of the Uganda International Airport, Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, and Gwadar Port and Balochistan province in Pakistan. He warns that China plans to do the same to other regions, such as Mongolia, Tibet, Taiwan, Manchuria, Burma, Nepal, and Bhutan. Abdul Salam argues that the Belt and Road Initiative, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the China-Europe high-speed rail network serve this goal.

The TIP ideologue further claims that China not only aims at economically subjugating countries but also it is a source of global political instability. Citing a newly released map of China that has drawn new borders (an updated version of the one published in 2023), Abdul Salam maintains that China is a threat to both minorities within the countries as well as to the integrity of other countries. Abdul Salam specifically argues that the new map of China has claimed Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh, Doklam, Galwan, and Tibet as its territory, and Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan have been portrayed as part of China.

The second half of the booklet actively calls on the international community to side with the TIP in its struggle against China. Abdul Salam claims that East Turkestan is the frontline for all countries that wish to oppose China’s global ambitions, calling on them to side with the TIP and help them in their conflict before the conflict reaches them.

Abdul Salam mentions the Belt and Road Initiative as one of the most rewarding potential targets for damaging Chinese interests. The militant claims that as East Turkestan is a focal node for the project that spreads from Xinjiang to the rest of Central Asia, any damage to the project will harm Chinese interests. Importantly, Abdul Salam indirectly refers to those countries in the West that are concerned by the expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative and other Chinese economic projects as Trojan horses for Chinese influence.

Abdul Salam concludes by stating that the TIP is extending a cooperative hand towards all those countries that are interested in tackling Chinese influence, and that “the defeat of the Chinese regime is an opportunity for all countries in the world, including America and Europe.”

The TIP directly threatens Beijing to start a new phase in its struggle against the Chinese government. The new phase of the conflict will include the death of “innocent people”, while cities and houses will be destroyed. Abdul Salam maintains that the main targets of the TIP will be Chinese forces stationed in Xinjiang, claiming that the TIP will bring the fight directly in the province until Chinese troops withdraw and East Turkestan becomes a sovereign state.

While the majority of the booklet shares content similar to those featured in several past publications, the key difference rests in the appealing language to the international community and Western audience and the timing of the publication. After the toppling of Bashar al-Assad and the end of the war in Syria, the TIP claimed that the group had achieved its two short-term objectives: the liberation of Afghanistan and the liberation of Syria. Since December 2024, the group has been spearheading a series of events in Syria aimed at raising awareness of the situation in Xinjiang. It appears that the TIP is preparing the ground for possibly opening a new front directly within Xinjiang province, although the circumstances remain still uncertain and murky.

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Since August 15, 2021, when the Afghan Taliban took over Afghanistan, the militant scenario in Pakistan has been rapidly changing. Today, it is marked by a number of key factors that have been developing since 2021 and of which January 2025 is remarkably representative.

A first factor is the hyperactivity of jihadist militant organisations. While several attacks have been repeatedly denied by security forces on the ground, often debunking militants’ allegations that they carried out an attack and inflicted casualties, still, Pakistani Taliban groups have been consistent in claiming a high number of attacks, highlighting the pressure they intend to exercise on security forces and the larger public, physically and psychologically. For instance, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed an increasing number of attacks since 2021, when it claimed 282: in 2022, the group claimed 367; in 2023, 881: and in 2024, 1,758. While many of these attacks could not be verified, they underscore the operational growth of the TTP.

Furthermore, while this is not an entirely new phenomenon, for some Pakistani Taliban factions more than others, the high number of claims is part of a larger design aimed at redefining their image through the articulation of a new structure. Pakistani Taliban have been focusing on improving their power-projection capabilities through the establishment of ever more complex structures that can convey the sense that the militant groups are expanding and increasing their strength. In 2024, for instance, the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group (HGB, or Tehreek-e-Taliban Ghazwatul Hind, TTG), framed a new structure that for the first time signaled that HGB was shifting from a jihadist tribal militia into a local powerhouse following the example of the TTP.

Thus, as the Pakistani Taliban attempt to expand their influence and power of attraction, they inevitably end up competing with each other for recruits and resources. This competition becomes manifest with the mergers of militant groups with the faction that outbids the others. The consequence is a political game between commanders and sub-factions who switch sides for opportunistic reasons or to consolidate their power-base on the local population.

Three major factions have monopolised the militant jihadist landscape in Pakistan: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Hafiz Gul Bahadur group (HGB, or Tehreek-e-Taliban Ghazwatul Hind, TTG), and Tehreek-e-Lashkar-e-Islam Pakistan (TLIP or simply LeI). While focusing solely on these three factions would underestimate the complexity of militant dynamics on the ground, they still represent an indicator of jihadist groups' changing approach to their ultimate politico-military goal. They also address some of the main factors that are affecting the militant scenario of Pakistan.

In the first three weeks of January 2025, the TTP, HGB, and LeI combined claimed more than 120 attacks across Pakistan. The areas of operations of their attacks remain within the trend of the previous year. The TTP claimed the majority of attacks in every province of Pakistan except Islamabad Capital Territory. While the TTP quantity of attacks is following the number of attacks claimed in December 2024 (182), the group has already exceeded the 75 attacks claimed in January 2024.

Similarly, HGB and LeI have both claimed several attacks concentrated in their usual operational areas: Khyber’s Tirah Maidan area for LeI and Bannu, North Waziristan, and even Dera Ismail Khan for HGB.

Furthermore, since the start of 2025, the jihadist militant environment in Pakistan has been marked by a series of changes that involve alliances between different Pakistani Taliban factions. In the span of just 19 days, the TTP was able to merge four new groups into its fold, while HGB suffered from the defection of a prominent commander and officially incorporated some commanders already affiliated and reinforced its alliance with an important militant faction.

Between January 14 and 16, the TTP announced that three militant groups from Balochistan Province had joined the group. Located in the Khuzdar and Mastung areas, which fall under the shadow province of Qalat and Makran for the TTP, Shahid Umar Baloch, Mawlawi Shoaib Baloch, and Mawlawi Yasir joined the TTP alongside their companions. Among these, Yasir is said to have several hundred militants, being one of the major groups that joined the TTP from Balochistan.

These mergers followed the defection to the TTP of another militant commander, Ali Dawar aka Alamgir, the supreme commander of the Jaish-e-Omeri (JeO) faction of HGB, on January 12. This marked the first major loss for HGB since 2020 after losing its own deputy, Commander Aleem Khan, who had also joined the TTP. Ali Dawar joined the TTP together with some of his own sub-commanders and militants of JeO; however, since JeO is a special faction of HGB made by militants coming from different groups of HGB, the special unit remains active under the leadership of HGB, who nominated Maulvi Farooq aka Maulvi Shafaq as the new head of JeO. Meanwhile, TTP militants affiliated with Ali Dawar published pictures and videos of the commander head of the suicide bomb squad of Ali Dawar together with suicide bombers carrying the TTP flag.

While militants from both Pakistani Taliban factions repeatedly stated that no enmity is sparked by these mergers, highlighting that TTP and HGB have the same goal, follow the same jihadist path, and differ only in tactics, a competition focused on power projection started between the TTP and HGB.

Between January 13 and 14, a day after Ali Dawar defected to the TTP, HGB announced the official incorporation of another commander into their jihadist platform. Mawlawi Abu Zar Bangash and his group from the Kohat area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa pledged allegiance to HGB via another prominent commander already affiliated with HGB: Mukhlis Mehsud. Both of them belong to the Hakeemullah Mehsud Karwan group, which pledged allegiance to HGB already in November 2024 via its commanders Mukhlis Mehsud and Zarar, led by Umar Mehsud. Later, on January 22, a commander from Dera Ismail Khan, Iftikhar aka Umar, pledged allegiance to HGB, with the group claiming also attacks in the district in the name of HGB.

While the mergers were important because they further expanded HGB's foothold outside the traditional North Waziristan-Bannu region, they were minor mergers. However, between January 16 and 18, rumors started to circulate among Pakistani Taliban members that HGB was set to announce a major development regarding Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) on January 18. Shortly after, LeI and HGB announced that the two groups had decided to reinforce their alliance by pledging unity of struggle.

Based in the Khyber tribal district's Tirah Valley, LeI is a powerful group that resurged in recent years, mostly after August 2021 and particularly since 2022. After the killing of its founding leader, Mangal Bagh, in January 2020 in a mysterious blast in Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan, LeI had been led briefly by Zala Khan Akakhel; however, as a prominent commander of the group revealed, due to an illness that struck the latter, Tayyab Afridi aka Ajnabi, one of the sons of Mangal Bagh and previously deputy to Zala Khan, became the new leader of LeI.

LeI has maintained independent leadership while nurturing close relations with both the TTP and HGB, mostly through connections with Jamaatul Ahrar (JuA) commanders and Majlis-e-Askari Karwan's leader, Akhtar Muhammad Khalil. Videos featuring tashkeel (fighting units) of Akhtar Muhammad Khalil and LeI walking in different areas of Tirah Valley in the Khyber tribal district were not uncommon, while occasionally, LeI and JuA militants conducted joint attacks in the same area.

Rumors about LeI and potential merger and/or unity are not new. In late February 2024, following a major crisis within the TTP involving JuA and some sections of the TTP leadership, there was news circulating among Pakistani Taliban circles that HGB, TTP, and LeI were considering forming a consolidated platform. At that time, talks were held between TTP, HGB, LeI, and JuA for 5/6 days allegedly facilitated by Afghan Taliban officials, according to a spokesman for HGB. However, no agreement was reached, mostly due to some reservations that HGB and LeI had concerning the TTP in relation to the murder of JuA founding leader, Omar Khalid Khorasani, for which at that time JuA had accused members of the TTP leadership of being involved. Eventually, the TTP and JuA managed to solve their contrasts, hence practically ending the experiment for creating a unified platform. However, different commanders of HGB, LeI, and JuA repeatedly said to The Khorasan Diary at that time that talks between HGB and LeI were still ongoing, and that the possibility of merging the two was not completely off the table.

Less than a year later, rumors started to circulate again. However, this time, the commanders of HGB and LeI confirmed that the pledge of unity of struggle had been taken. It became official when the spokespersons of the two factions openly acknowledged it.

Meanwhile, on January 18, the TTP inaugurated its new structure for the year 2025. An annual practice started in 2022, the structure of the TTP has been increasingly expanding in its multiple articulations. In mid-2022, the TTP displayed a limited number of shadow provinces, first seven and then eight by the end of the year. At the same time, for the first time, it openly revealed the presence of an internal administration divided into different ministries. The structure outlined for 2024 included 11 shadow provinces whose number increased during the year, reaching a total of 14. However, in 2025, the TTP massively expanded its structure by reaching the number of 37 shadow provinces, adding new ones for Balochistan while fragmentation larger provinces into small ones, often matching the actual district-level administration of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Additionally, the 2025 chart outlined in detail the administration of every province and every ministry. Furthermore, the TTP inaugurated new committees for overseeing the overall administration of the provinces in addition to the already established commissions for military operations.

For the first time ever, the TTP also disclosed the members of the Rahbari Shura or Leadership Council. Comprising 17 members, it includes senior leaders of the TTP and founders but also prominent commanders and veterans. It also reveals that the TTP opted for a balance of power among factions and institutions in the Leadership Council while reinforcing the grip of the leader of the group, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud.

All of these changes highlight the fluid characteristics of the composition of the militant landscape in Pakistan. They also underscore how Pakistani Taliban factions have been able - to different degrees - to accommodate both a long-term, ambitious vision and local, warlord-like short-term objectives. This is possibly the deadliest combination for Pakistan’s security environment because it encapsulates local conflicts and grievances into a higher goal. And for now, the Pakistani Taliban seem to have found an effective strategy to streamline both.

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Al-Azaim Foundation’s linguistic branches usually feature a number of either ideologues or speakers to present their audio and video contents. For instance, the Pashto branch frequently releases audio lessons and sermons read by ISKP Mufti, Abu Fateh Khorasani (Ziauddin Zarkheredi), and other top ideologues, such as Abu Abdulrahman and Abu Huzaifa. In contrast, the Tajiki branch employs several speakers who deliver concise statements on a number of different issues, mostly motivational ones addressing supporters.

However, Al-Azaim Foundation’s Farsi branch features one young and versed religious figure, Zaid Badri.

The personal background of Zaid Badri is not known, and the only details available about him are deduced from Zaid Badri’s propaganda products featured in his own channels and in Al-Azaim’s. He emerged in late 2022 when he started to publish some videos commenting on the right aqeeda (creed) that is being propagated by the Islamic State. The series counted 14 episodes and became the first media product of Zaid Badri. In the videos, Zaid Badri appears masked and holding a gun; however, he does not provide any detail about his background, and the videos do not bear the logo of Al-Azaim Foundation, hinting that he produced such lessons alone.

Around the same time, Zaid Badri published another round of 14 lessons about the importance of jihad and the ruling of fighting while waging it. Similarly to the religious lessons, this series also did not feature Al-Azaim Foundation’s mark but were independently recorded. The series was subsequently complemented by other smaller series - five to seven episodes long - commenting on other aspects of jihad, such as answering to scholars who undermine the importance of jihad; limiting jihad to inner struggle; or arguing that the time of jihad has ended in certain geographical areas. Zaid Badri refutes all these positions by claiming that the Islamic State, today, is the only group upholding the concept of jihad.

Zaid Badri’s speeches, coupled with his apparently young age, were widely circulated online among Farsi and Dari-speaking ISKP supporters, such as in the main unofficial pro-ISKP Telegram channel Bazargasht-e-Khilafat, with hundreds of ISKP supporters allegedly from Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. Self-declared online students of Zaid Badri started to circulate a message praising Zaid Badri’s skills and commitment to IS ideology, asking other youngsters to follow his example. The poster was written in Tajiki language and translated into Farsi, too.

Evidently, Zaid Badri entered into contact - or was directly recruited - by Al-Azaim Foundation’s Farsi wing between early-mid 2023, as he started pumping out new audio series bearing the introduction of Al-Azaim Foundation, where the latter explicitly mentioned that the program was provided by the ISKP media wing and presented by Zaid Badri. Hence, Zaid Badri released two main series: a 28-episode-long series on the Afghan Taliban and another 11-episode-long series on the characteristics of the khawarij (those ostracized from the fold of Islam). While the latter is the audio summary of an ISKP book published in Farsi language in May 2022, mostly criticizing the Afghan Taliban, the former is a long series explicitly framed in order to challenge the new regime in Afghanistan and Afghan Taliban’s policies by juxtaposing them to the Islamic State. In both series, Zaid Badri amplifies ISKP message aimed at eroding support for the Afghan Taliban and luring militants into the folds of ISKP. Around the same time, Zaid Badri also started to translate from Arabic language into Persian some editorials of the Islamic State’s al-Naba weekly newsletter, including numbers from 397 to 417 (June-November 2023).

Zaid Badri also collaborated with Mubarezeen Media, another pro-ISKP media affiliated with Al-Azaim Foundation publishing in Pashto, Farsi, and Tajiki languages. The media house published a brief religious series featuring Zaid Badri around the same time he started collaborating with Al-Azaim Foundation.

Al-Azaim Foundation also broadcasted again the 14 lessons in jihad published by Zaid Badri by adding Al-Azaim Foundation’s introduction at the beginning, hence elevating Zaid Badri’s production to official ISKP propaganda. The same treatment was reserved for all other pre-Al-Azaim Foundation propaganda products published independently by Zaid Badri.

Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of Zaid Badri became evident between March and April 2024, after the Crocus City Hall attack claimed by the Islamic State in Moscow. Shortly after the attack, prominent jihadi scholar and Tajik national Sheikh Abu Muhammad Madani termed the attack a conspiracy made by Russian and Tajik authorities and condemned it because it resulted in the killing of many civilians. Abu Muhammad Madani, who had studied in Uzbekistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, according to his personal biography, was revered by Tajik supporters of ISKP as a beacon of religious knowledge; while he never openly declared his support for IS, he frequently used terminology and ideology aking to IS, paralleling its themes and anti-state rhetoric. However, after he rejected the Crocus City Hall attack, thrice, he was takfired (ostracized and sentenced to death), by ISKP when Al-Azaim Foundation published a 4-page-long book against him, followed by a shorter audio version. A couple of weeks later, another ancillary media of Al-Azaim Foundation, Risana al-Hadeed published a 56-page-long book that reinforced its criticism against Abu Muhammad Madani.

It became evident that the author behind the books - at least the Al-Azaim Foundation’s one - is Zaid Badri himself, who also provided the audio summary. Zaid Badri published three more detailed videos where he discussed in depth why the Islamic State takfired Abu Muhammad Madani, directly challenging the scholar. Since the two booklets represent the most significant and entirely original pieces of propaganda recently produced by Al-Azaim Foundation’s Farsi branch, they highlight Zaid Badri’s position as a key ideologue for ISKP. Furthermore, it is important to note that Zaid Badri’s propaganda and sermons are widely shared among supporters from Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, and, in some instances, even among Iranian Kurdish supporters, who are present in Persian-speaking IS groups.

Among Zaid Badri’s most recent series, there is also a small audio-video production where he draws inspiration from ISKP propaganda and answers point-by-point sermons released by Afghan Taliban’s Supreme Leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada.

Zaid Badri’s supporters continue to share his propaganda production on different social media platforms and messaging apps, while the militant himself occasionally releases new audio messages.

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Sheikh Hakeemullah was a prominent religious figure among TTP members from Bajaur tribal district, and was currently serving as senior member of the Shura (council) of Malakand shadow province of the TTP. According to a document published by the TTP in early 2024, Sheikh Hakeemullah was among the seven members who were part of the Shura under the leadership of Malakand shadow governor and senior TTP member Mawlana Azmatullah Mehsud, a veteran TTP founding member. In Afghanistan, Sheikh Hakeemullah was head of madrassa Manbah ul Uloom, located in Kunar province, where he used to teach religious subjects to locals and to TTP family members. He had achieved the status of Sheikh ul Hadith and also was an Hafiz, having memorized the Holy Quran.

Sheikh Hakeemullah was a native of Salarzai area of Bajaur tribal district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan. His father was also killed in Kunar during an operation carried out by US and Afghan republican security forces. Since 2007, Sheikh Hakeemullah had been an affiliate of Afghan Taliban and TTP, working in Bajaur to exercise religious activities in line with Afghan Taliban’s ideology, gathering support for the Taliban. Subsequently, he moved to Afghanistan, where he was later captured by Afghan security forces and where he spent around nine years in the prison of Bagram, where many TTP and Afghan Taliban members were being held. Eventually, he was freed after August 15, 2021, with the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, when several TTP members were released from the prisons of Pul-e-Charkhi and Bagram. While in prison, Sheikh Hakeemullah used to preach to other inmates and allegedly was able to recruit new members to the TTP from both Afghan and Pakistani prisoners.

Some TTP members accused Afghan Taliban member Haji Usman Turabi, former governor of Kunar and current police chief of Kapisa province, of conspiring against and assassinating Sheikh Hakeemullah. Retaining family links between Kunar and Bajaur, Usman Turabi is a prominent and controversial Afghan Taliban figure who is held in high esteem by Afghan Taliban for his involvement in defeating Islamic State Khorasan (ISKP) in Nangarhar province in 2019. Usman Turabi is also close to Pakistan’s religious political party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). However, some TTP members particularly from Bajaur and Swat areas accuse him of having worked with the Pakistani state on multiple occasions. Usman Turabi had been previously appointed as governor of Kunar in 2021, but was later dismissed from the position due to malcontent from both local population as well as from TTP members living in Kunar, many of whom are from Bajaur and Swat areas. As a result of his activities against ISKP, Usman Turabi is also most wanted by ISKP, which in the past years tried to assassinate him on multiple occasions, succeeding in killing only his guards and personal commanders in Bajaur, where he frequently travels.

At the same time, some TTP members requested the intervention of Afghan Taliban authorities to solve the issue, specifically referring to a number of mysterious assassinations carried out in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces targeting TTP members. A number of TTP social media accounts also argued that Afghan Taliban should move to secure bases to TTP and Al-Qaida members in Afghanistan; protect religious scholars and influential leaders, either part of or sympathetic to the TTP; and provide a stable solution and settle the families of TTP and Al-Qaida members who migrated to Afghanistan.

Date: May 2024

Method: Monitoring of group propaganda (videos, photos, statements, claims) and reports from field sources.

Areas/Country: Pakistan

Using the TTP publication and with the help of graphs, we can see that the group conducted 98 attacks in May. The targets remain almost always the same: the Pakistani army, Pakistani police, counter-terrorist operatives and border guards.

Below the graphs to see the areas of military activity in May:

Out of 98 claimed attacks, 92 have been carried out in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, while three in Balochistan province (Quetta and Zhob districts), and three in Punjab province (Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Dera Ghazi Khan, in the south).

The larger Waziristan region witnessed most attacks, with the North Waziristan tribal district registering 21 attacks and the South Waziristan tribal district 16. In line with the ongoing pattern of insurgency, the Khyber tribal district also witnesses a high number of attacks, 13 in total. However, two regions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have been marked by an unusual spate of attacks.  Tank district and Bajaur tribal district registered 11 and 10 attacks, respectively, mostly targeting security forces but also local tribal militias. This highlights the TTP new offensive in these two territories; particularly, Bajaur witnessed a considerable increase in attacks which started the previous month.

Compared to previous months, the TTP continues to be militarily very active, maintaining a very high number of military operations, as can be seen from the following graph:

Conclusion:

The TTP’s ongoing insurgency remains set on the trajectory the group inaugurated in full force in August 2021. After the brief hiatus of 2022 during the attempted peace talks between Islamabad and the TTP, the latter has been steadily increasing not only the number of claimed attacks in the country, but also expanding its areas of operations from traditionally Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and increasingly into Balochistan and, recently, Punjab, marking a turn in the group’s challenge to the authorities.

In the next months, the TTP attack will gain more strength and increase over time, possibly involving new areas of attacks and reinforcing current ones.

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However, not only IS, but also other jihadist entities – militant and online ones – have resumed their anti-Western posture, linking it to the ongoing conflict in Gaza and other events, thus developing a competition among jihadists on attacks in the West.

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The militant landscape of Pakistan is becoming more complex due to the emergence of several new, small, and highly capable militant groups. These groups ostensibly act as independent entities and claim to admire the Afghan Taliban’s model of a jihadist group that effectively transitioned from insurgency to a de facto government. However, they maintain that their fight is solely confined to Pakistan, where they seek to enforce sharia.

These groups include Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), Ansarul Jihad (AuJ), Majlis-e-Askari, Jaish-e-Fursan-e-Muhammad, Jabhat al-Junud al-Mahdi (headed by Amir Sufiyan), and Jabhat Ansar al-Mahdi Khorasan (JAMK). Their links with their parent organizations—the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB, named after its founder and current leader)—have been disclosed by the militants themselves, their own modalities, and their patterns of attack (The Khorasan Diary, July 13, 2023). They are, therefore, anything but independent.

Jabhat Ansar al-Mahdi Khorasan’s Activities and Importance

JAMK first emerged quietly in late 2022, but in 2023 the group started to consistently claim attacks targeting Pakistan’s security forces, especially in the Bannu District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (X/@SaleemMehsud, February 14, 2023). The group is part of the broader HGB organization and constitutes one of its main factions. It is vital to situate the emergence of JAMK—as well as all newly formed militant groups—in the environment that arose after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan on August 15, 2021. After the Taliban seized power, Jihadist militant groups carefully balanced their objective of creating an ideologically driven “Islamic” proto-state with the policies of the Taliban’s Afghan Interim Government (AIG), which both sheltered the groups and restrained them (Dawn, July 10, 2023). In Afghanistan, militants can gain access to modern weapons, but acquiring them is difficult and is monitored by the Afghan Taliban (The Khorasan Diary, January 4).

Conversely, JAMK was born in a progressively expanding area of cooperation between different militant groups, such as the TTP and HGB. This trend has been endorsed by external militant entities, such as al-Qaeda and its local branch, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) (The Khorasan Diary, June 4, 2023). Since late 2023, this cooperation has expanded to include coordinated attacks by the TTP and Tehreek-e-Lashkar-e-Islam Pakistan (TLIP) (X/@abdsayedd, December 14, 2023). The group has conducted most of its attacks in the Bannu District, particularly the areas of Jani Khel and Baka Khel (X/@SaleemMehsud, June 16, 2023). The group has also disclosed that it carried out attacks in Lakki Marwat District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, in May 2023. This confirms it has the capability to launch attacks in multiple neighboring districts (The Khorasan Diary, February 14).

While HGB includes many subgroups, JAMK quickly rose to prominence thanks to its dedication to forming a proper media entity tasked with methodically claiming attacks. JAMK also releases videos and statements from the group’s leadership. This starkly contrasts with HGB, which has remained media-shy and avoided public attention.

JAMK’s Leadership

JAMK is headed by Commander Sadiqullah, who is from the Wazir tribe of the Baka Khel Area of Bannu District. There is no deputy emir of the group. However, every year, the group selects new individuals for several departments of the group, which is similar to the TTP. Among other vital figures, Maulvi Umar Mansoor Haqqani is in charge of the group’s military operations (The Khorasan Diary, February 15). According to JAMK spokesman Zubair Waziristani, the group includes five sections: the al-Nusra Department, the Institute of Research and Publication, the Department of War, the Department of Intelligence, and the Central Shura. [1]

The media arm of the group is called al-Mansoor Media. On November 21, 2023, Zubair Waziristani officially inaugurated the media arm by releasing the official logo and sharing more videos and claims of attacks by JAMK. Previously, videos from the group featured mid-level commanders, such as Mawlana Abid Waziristani. However, after November 21, the group published a video series that imitated those produced by the TTP, such as one series dedicated to the al-Badr Battalion suicide squad (The Khorasan Diary, November 22, 2023).

The first JAMK-claimed suicide attack followed this uptick in media activities. On November 26, 2023, the group declared that one of its militants bombed a Pakistan Army convoy in the Baka Khel Area of Bannu District, killing two nearby civilians and wounding ten other people (Dawn, November 27, 2023). Since the start of the new year, JAMK has claimed eight other attacks, primarily against surveillance cameras and security forces on patrol in the Jani Khel and Baka Khel areas of Bannu District (Dawn, February 8).

Conclusion

The potential threat posed by JAMK rests in its ability to carry out unpredictable suicide attacks against security forces in an area where both the TTP and HGB operate. Moreover, shortly after the November 26, 2023 attack, Pakistan formally asked the AIG to hand over Hafiz Gul Bahadur himself, who is allegedly residing in the southern Afghan provinces of Paktika and Khost (The Friday Times, December 13, 2023). Pakistan also noted that the suicide attacker was identified as an Afghan national, which is consistent with Pakistan’s allegations that the TTP, TJP, and HGB are deploying Afghan nationals in suicide operations (The Express Tribune, November 30, 2023). JAMK and HGB pose a threat to Pakistan, but they also risk disturbing Pakistan’s bilateral relations with Afghanistan and contributing to the destabilization of the South Asian region.

Notes:

[1] Interview of the author with JAMK spokesman, conducted remotely, February 22, 2024.

Since early 2023, the militant landscape in Pakistan has become quite intricate and evolved into a more complex dynamic, including the emergence of new groups; the alignment of different factions; and changes in policies by militant leaders.

Throughout 2023, new names began to surface more frequently, with groups continuing to claim responsibility for several attacks, in addition to the usual ones. ¬

Hence, Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP) and Ansarul Jihad (AuJ) emerged as new and apparently independent organisations. Meanwhile, some of the nearly defunct or dormant organisations also resumed their attacks, even if for a brief time.  Such groups include Lashkar-e-Khorasan and Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI). On the other hand, sub-factions of other major organisations such as Jabhat Ansar al-Mahdi Khorasan (JAMK), began to step up attacks and media warfare More significantly, militant organisations adopted a change in their structure and internal policies, occasionally sparking differences among affiliates, as it had been the case with the recent frictions between TTP and Jamaatul Ahrar (JuA), now seemingly resolved.

While it is evident that jihadist organisations in Pakistan have been gradually repositioning themselves after the restoration of the Islamic Emirate – whether in collusion, guided, or directly or indirectly influenced by the trajectory of the Afghan Taliban – it is also clear that jihadist organisations in Pakistan are reaching new phases in their evolution, displaying a cunning and patient approach in framing their struggle vis-à-vis Islamabad. 

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is the most vivid example of such transformation, adopting new tactics both in terms of attacks as well as in terms of relations with other jihadist factions; jihadist politics; and media warfare.   But while the TTP already started the process in 2018 –when the current leader, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, took the reigns over the fragmented umbrella alliance and slowly patched it – recently, another major Pakistani Taliban faction, Hafiz Gul Bahadur group (HGB), has made important changes in its structure and modus operandi.

Hafiz Gul Bahadur New Structure

At the start of 2023, factions affiliated with the HGB started gaining more prominence by claiming both low-intensity and major attacks, particularly in the Bannu district and the North Waziristan district of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. These factions carried names such as Jabhat Ansar al-Mahdi Khorasan (JAMK), Ittehad Mujahideen Khorasan (IMK), Majlis-e-Askari (MA), Jabhat al-Junood al-Mahdi (JJM), Jaish-e-Fursan-e-Muhammad (JFM), and Jaish-e-Omari (JeO). 

All these factions operate under the umbrella of the HGB group, which in total counts around 60 to 70 different sub-factions and tashkeel (fighting units). The number of militants belonging to these units might vary; however, they usually comprise between 200-300 men. These sub-factions collaborate closely with each other, often exchanging militants between groups and coordinating joint attacks, although they do not openly acknowledge this cooperation in a formal manner.

On November 26, 2023, JAMK conducted a suicide attack, targeting a military convoy of Pakistan’s Army in the Baka Khel area of the Bannu district. In 2024, JeO claimed the first suicide attack of the year carried out in Pakistan in Mir Ali area of North Waziristan tribal district, while it also claimed another suicide attack on March 16, 2024, which it said was carried out in collaboration with JFM against security forces in Mir Ali area. The latter attack was followed by a ground assault from a team of militants, marking a change in the tactics of the group. The joint attack resulted in the death of at least seven security personnel and the injury of 17 more, making it one of the major attacks claimed by HGB over the last few years. 

This latest attack also had a domino effect on Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, with a new phase of friction occurring between the two countries. Specifically, on March 18, Pakistan conducted cross-border airstrikes in Paktika and Khost provinces of Afghanistan in retaliation for the JeO-JFM suicide attack. The targets of the attack were TTP and HGB militants in Afghanistan; however, the victims of the bombing were civilians, including the families of militants. In return, Afghanistan’s border troops retaliated by opening fire from several positions on the border into Pakistan’s installations. The outbreak of violence between the two states was the last point of a long trail of accusations moved by Pakistan against Afghanistan, with the former claiming that the majority of suicide attacks conducted in Pakistan in 2023 employed Afghan nationals. On November 26, 2023, after JAMK conducted the suicide attack, Pakistan urged Afghanistan to hand over Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who according to Pakistan, has been residing in the southern part of Afghanistan.

While on the one hand, the intensification of HGB attacks and its sub-factions started to become more prominent, on the other, HGB decided to reform and adopt a gradual shift, mirroring the trajectory of the TTP from a constellation of loosely linked groups to a more robust alliance. 

Hence, between February and March, HGB established two new commissions: the Economic Commission and the Reform Commission. The two new organs of HGB were tasked with enacting a series of rules that normalized and sanctioned the behavior of affiliated militants, thus providing a more coordinated modus operandi of the group. 

Another organ of the group was also established, the Al-Nusra Department, tasked with coordinating the militant activities in North Waziristan. The announcements were issued by Hafiz Gul Bahadur and the Rahbari Shura, nominating Khalid Haider Khel as head of the Al-Nusra Department, whereas Maulvi Ilham Mada Khel, Commander Zubair Bura Khel, and Commander Jalali Jani Khel were appointed as his area assistants.

Importantly, the message was circulated again – this time in video format – by JAMK media arm, Al-Mansoor Media, on March 20. In a video, JAMK head of the Military Commission, Maulvi Omar Mansoor Haqqani, appeared alongside Commander Jalali Jani Khel. Mansoor Haqqani specifically referred to Jalali Jani Khel as the head of the department of Al-Nusra for the Jani Khel zone and acknowledged Khalid Haider Khel as head of all the zones in North Waziristan. Particularly, Jalali Khel appears to be a dynamic and active commander of HGB, as he is from the ranks of JJM and recently sent several warnings to people in Jani Khel area warning them against playing music. Along with him several other HGB commanders from Jani Khel are seen pledging allegiance to the group.

In the video published by JAMK, Mansoor Haqqani also referred to 12 tasks that under the leadership of Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Khalid Haider Khel, and the members of the Reform Commission, will be enacted by the organization. Some of these rules include individual warnings, such as regarding the shaving of beard, while others set specific guidelines for all factions, such as prohibiting the collection of donations as the Economic Commission will be solely tasked to do that.

The Reform Commission appears to be the main organ tasked with coordinating the efforts for restructuring the organization. In two separate private conversations with a top commander of JAMK and to HGB spokesman, it was confirmed that the Reform Commission is tasked with merging 60-70 sub-factions and tashkeel under one platform. 

The 12 new rules outlined by the JAMK video will be actually applied by the Reform Commission. For this reason, the commission is made up of eight members. Headed by Mufti Sadiq Noor, other members are Maulvi Mehbubul Rehman Muntazar; Maulvi Mohsin; Maulvi Sardar Ali Khan; Maulvi Sadiq; Maulvi Siyyed Khan; Maulvi Rahi Khan; and Maulvi Ehsanullah.

According to HGB spokesman, Mufti Sadiq Noor, who is a deputy of Hafiz Gul Bahadur (not to be confused with Mufti Sadiq Noor Masul), is considered one of the most prominent members of HGB, as he is older than Hafiz Gul Bahadur, and is also aiding the Reform Commission.

Furthermore, this reorganizational process also affected individual organisations. At least one confirmed restructuring effort has been underway in possibly the major sub-faction of HGB, JAMK, which is headed by Amir Sadiq. In an interview with a JAMK spokesman, he revealed that JAMK has an internal structure that resembles HGB. Counting five departments both JAMK and HGB have the Al-Nusra Department; the Department for Research and Publication; the Department of War; the Intelligence Agency; and the Central System or Central Shura. These departments are in direct contact with the new commissions set up by HGB in order to bring all movements under the HGB central umbrella.

On the other hand, other sub-factions of HGB did not present the same level of elaborate structure. Most of them, even the ones which carried out some of the most devastating attacks in Pakistan, only feature the leading commander, thus being more akin to tashkeel rather than full-fledged groups. All commanders are companions of Hafiz Gul Bahadur; hence, MA is led by Commander Khalil; JeO is led by Commander Ali Dawar; JFM is led by Commander Khalid Waziristani; while Amir Sufiyan is leader of the Sufiyan Karwan, now known also as JJM, with Fikarman being another prominent commander of JJM.

It is important to note that while HGB is mirroring the TTP in the reorganizational process, both are inspired by the Afghan Taliban, Hafiz Gul Bahadur denied meeting the Afghan Taliban supreme leader, Amir al-Momineen Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. 

It is possible that Hafiz Gul Bahadur is hiding his connection to the Afghan Taliban key leadership; however, it is also probable that given the secrecy of the Afghan Taliban supreme leader, the latter might want to avoid any possibly problematic exposure and repercussions, hence avoiding meeting him. However, a top Commander of JAMK confirmed in a private conversation that the recent talks of a possible merger between different Pakistani Taliban factions have been held under the patronage of the Islamic Emirate. 

It is however evident that HGB cannot nor has the will to over-expand the restructuring efforts to the level of the TTP. Hence, an HGB spokesman, in an interview, revealed that HGB will not establish so-called Ministers nor shadow provinces, considering the geographical divisions of North Waziristan and Bannu districts only useful for military tactical reasons.

A New Phase of Militancy

Following the March 16 complex suicide attack staged by JeO and JFM, JeO spokesman, Zarar Dawar, issued a detailed statement announcing that the attack had marked the starting of the Spring Offensive of the HGB platform, stating that North Waziristan tribal district and Bannu district were the battleground for the group. 

Together with the increase in the quantity and quality of attacks, HGB is also expanding the number of subgroups part of the outfit. On February 21, a group from Khyber tribal district, headed by Tariq Afridi, pledged allegiance to Hafiz Gul Bahadur. Meanwhile, on March 8, several commanders from Jani Khel, Mamand Khel, Shewa, Aba Khel, Mada Khel, and Razmak areas of North Waziristan also pledged allegiance to Hafiz Gul Bahadur. Remarkably, in October 2023, Commander Ismail Shaheen, head of the Asmatullah Shaheen Bhittani group, pledged allegiance to Hafiz Gul Bahadur. Located in Tank district, the group owes its name to Asmatullah Shaheen, who briefly served as acting Amir of the TTP in 2013 after the death of Hakeemullah Mehsud. 

The general reorganization that HGB is witnessing is reminiscent of the TTP one, both in terms of attacks and merging of groups, though on a smaller scale. This is directly linked to the territoriality of HGB, which is entrenched in the North Waziristan and Bannu areas of Pakistan. However, the recent talks of a merger between different factions of Pakistani Taliban, including HGB, reveal the aspiration of the group to step up its struggle, increasing the pressure on security forces and marking its presence on the ground.

Hence, it is important to situate HGB's recent trajectory not only in parallel with the TTP ones but also in the current militant landscape in Pakistan. Since August 15, 2021, militant jihadist organisations in Pakistan have undergone significant changes, becoming more sophisticated and ambitious. Surely, this is indebted, directly or indirectly, to the Afghan Taliban and their insurgency and today’s government as a model for other jihadist groups; however, there are strong indicators that Pakistani Taliban are now capable of framing new tactics independently thanks to the knowledge acquired throughout decades of insurgency.

Apart from HGB's connections to Afghan Taliban, its ties to global jihadists are also very much established, given that in the past he provided a base for Al-Qaeda, including its top leadership, in his hometown of North Waziristan tribal district for more than a decade. Additionally, HGB hosted for years the militant faction of the so-called Haqqani Network in the area, which included close relatives and aides of the current Afghan Interim Government (AIG) Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani.

During HGB leadership, North Waziristan served as a crucial hub for numerous operations carried out during the initial ten years of the Afghan Taliban-led insurgency. This region played a pivotal role in supporting operations in the Eastern Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktika, Paktia, and Nangarhar, and even facilitated major attacks by the Haqqani network against the International Coalition and Afghan republican forces in Kabul. However, with the departure of US-led NATO forces and the subsequent collapse of the Ashraf Ghani government, HGB shifted its focus towards Pakistan, re-directing its struggle aimed at the former republican regime in Afghanistan to the current government’s system in Pakistan.

Significantly, soon after the start of the attack, the spokesmen of two major subfactions of Hafiz Gul Bahadur group (HGB) claimed responsibility for the assault, arguing that a joint operation between Jaish-e-Fursan-e-Muhammad (JFM) and Jaish-e-Omari (JeO) was undergoing in the area. The spokesmen of the two factions, Nasratullah Waziristani and Zarar Dawar, respectively, constantly gave live update on the attack, sharing also videos of the initial explosion and subsequent clashes, hinting that more militants were surrounding the area of the attack to record and take pictures.

Some HGB members shared the names of some attackers online; hence, it was revealed that the militant who rammed the vehicle laden with explosives into the military installation in order to pave the way for other HGB militants was named Zarqawi, from the Al-Hamza Battalion of the JFM suicide squad. Initial message circulated by HGB members, instead, claimed that he was named Jafar. This is because the real name of the individual was Jafar and his nom de guerre Zarqawi, as HGB spokesman confirmed. Meanwhile, another militant, Junaid, was killed in early clashes with security forces. Both Fursan al-Aalaam – the media mouthpiece of JFM – and several members of the group issued statements in Pashto and Urdu detailing the attack.

Eventually, Pakistan’s security forces effectively repelled the attackers. A joint statement from the two HGB factions revealed that in total, 6 attackers took part in the operation; four died in the first suicide attack and in the subsequent clashes, while two managed to escape the scene and rejoin their groups.

In a private conversation, HGB spokesman added that all six militants had been trained in North Waziristan in camps which are operational under HGB umbrella. Three militants including Jafar had been trained in North Waziristan, where HGB had recently opened a training center under the leadership of Khalid Waziristani, the amir of JFM. While the three other militants had been trained in a camp operated by JeO, whose amir is Ali Dawar.

It is significant to highlight that this marks the first openly claimed collaboration between two different HGB factions. While in the past, JFM and JeO had carried out attacks, in a change, HGB is increasingly relying on social media to signal its operations and the activities of its militants, in a similar way as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). As a matter of fact, several TTP affiliated media channels also reported the attack, sharing the updates given by JFM spokesman, Nasratullah Waziristani, through Fursan al-Aalaam. Such a high profile attack by HGB militants is not frequent, as the group usually stages suicide attacks without the follow-up of other militants who assault the security forces. Such tactics have been extensively employed by a TTP affiliate, Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), which, however, has gone silent for the last four months.

More details from the HGB are expected to be released soon, as HGB spokesman hinted that the group was soon going to release obituaries of the deceased militants as well as a video documenting the attack.

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